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CHAPTER I
EARLY SPACE STATION PLANS
Almost from the first time humans thought about leaving the surface
of this planet, one theme has been the creation of some form of human
outpost in space. In fiction, and during this century in increasingly
specific engineering detail, the spac3 station concept has been extensively
discussed. In one of the two major space-faring nations, the Soviet
Union, a fairly rudimentary but still very capable space station program,
centered on the Salyut spacecraft, has been ongoing since 1971. In the
other space power, the United States, the desirability of developing some
kind of permanent manned presence in space is now under consideration, as it
has been on several occasions over the past twenty-five years. This report
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thus on the political process, both within NASA and external to it, through
which space station proposals were assessed during the 1959-1980 period.
There is little attention given to the development of space station designs
per se, or to other technical aspects of the space station concept such
as, for example, debates over the need for artificial gravity or over the
appropriate source of in-orbit power.
1/
A.	 Pre-History: Space Stations of the Imagination
Perhaps the first detailed plan for a space station was contained in
an 1869 Atlantic Monthly article by Edward Everett Hale, "The Brick Moon."
Hale proposed a 60-meter-diameter satellite, made of bricks and housing a
crew of 37. From a 6000 km orbit, the brick moon would serve as a naviga-
tional aid for ships.; communications were by Morse code, with signals
created by the stat'ion's occupants jumping up and down on the satellite's
exterior surface!
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Space pioneers Konstantin Tsiolkovsky and Herman Oberth both gave
some attention to building orbital stations. Tsiolkovsky discussed the
idea as early as 1911, and in 1923 wrote of staying "at a distance of
2000-3000 versts [a Russian unit of distance equal to 0.6629 miles] from
the Earth, as its Moon. Little by little appear colonies with supplements,
materials, machines, and structures brought from Earth." In his 1923 book
The Rocket into Interplanetary Space, Oberth first described an orbiting
manned satellite as a "space station," and proposed that it could be
used as an Earth observation site, world communications link, weather
satellite, or as an orbital refueling station ) For outward-bound space
vehicles.
Others in Europe wrote of stations during the twenties and thirties,
and their ideas were quite familiar to the team of German rocket scientists
led by Wernher von Braun when it began operation in the United States
after World War II. Some form of large space platform was a central part
of von Braun's thinking throughout the 1950s, and his ideas got wide
publicity in a Collier's magazine special section of March 22 1952
titled "Man Will Conquer Space Soon." Von Braun's contribution to the
magazine was an article called "Crossing the Last Frontier," in which he
claimed that "scientists and engineers now know how to build a station in
space that would circle the earth, 1,075 miles up. . .
	 If we do it, we
can not only preserve the peace but we can take a long step toward uniting
mankind." Von Braun's plan called for a triple-decked, 250-foot wide,
wheel-shaped station in polar orbit (See Figure 1) which would be a
"superb observation post" and from which "a trip to the moan itself will
opiGINAL PAGE IS
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Figure 1. VON BRAUN STATION: CONCEPT
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t be just a step." The main station would be accompanied by a free-flying
{	 unmanned but man-tended astronomical observatory.
i
Von Braun noted that the station would not be alone in space; "there
will nearly always be one or two rocket ships unloading supplies near to the
station." "Space taxis" or "shuttle-craft," as von Braun described them, would
ferry both men and materials from the rocket ships to the station itself.
Von Braun noted a number of uses for a space station:
-- "a springboard for exploration of the solar system"
-- "a watchdog of the peace"
-^ a meteorological observation post
-- a navigation aid for ships and airplanes
-- "a terribly effective atomic bomb carrier."`"
This detailed description was only one of the many concepts developed
in the years after World War II prior to the 1957 launch of Sputnik and the
formal beginning of the Space Age; everN before the United States had an
official space program, most of the possible uses of a space station had
been identified by visionaries who dreamed of space travel. The past
twenty-five years, im this country at least, have been spent in debating
whether to translate some form of that vision into reality.
3/
B.	 The Earliest Years: Planning a Post-Mercury Space Program—
Even before it opened its doors for business on October i s 1958, NASA
had been assigned the responsibility for manned
developed Project Mercury as the initial manned
Y
leadership set as a high priority task developi
the agency's first decade. A space station was
a post-Mercury goal. The House Space Committee
space flight and had
activity. The NASA
7g a long-range plan for
a `reading candidate for
in early 1959 concluded
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_ 	 that stations were the logical follow-on to Mercury, and von Braun (then
still working for the Army) presented a similar view in his briefings to
NASA. At this time, the German rocket team had developed an elaborate
scheme, called Project Horizon, for Army utilization of space, including
military outposts on the lunar surface.
In the first half of 1959, NASA created a Research Steering Committee
on Manned Space Flight, chaired by Harry Goett. At the first meeting of
this committee members placed a space station ahead of a lunar expedition
In a list of logical post-Mercury steps. In subsequent meetings, the
debate centered on the research values, especially with respect to biomedical
studies, of a station versus the excitement of a lunar landing goal. While
some members of the committee argued that "the ultimate objective of
space exploration is mantled travel to and from other planets," the Langley
representative argued for an interim step, since "in true space flight
man and the vehicle are going to be subjected to the space environment
for extended periods of time and there will undoubtedly be space rendezvous
requirements. All of these aspects need extensive study. . . . the best
means would be with a true orbiting space laboratory that is manned and
4/
that can have a crew and equipment change. 	 Ultimately, the Goett
committee recommended that a lunar landing be established as NASA's long-
range goal, on the grounds that it was a true "end-objective" requiring
no justification in terms of some larger goals to which it contributed.
These recommendations were not immediately accepted. In 1960, Robert
Gilruth told a space station symposium that "it appears that the multi-
manned earth satellites are achievable	 . ., while such programs as
manned lunar landing and return should not be directly pursued at this time."
I-6
At an August 1960 industry briefing on NASA's future plans, George Low
presented a scheme in which a manned lunar landing and creation of a
space station were given equal treatment as long range goals of the NASA
program; Low told the conference that "in this decade, therefore, our
present planning calls for the development and demonstration of an advanced
manned spacecraft with sufficient flexibilit y to be capable of both cir-
cumlunar flight and useful earth orbital missions. In the long range,
this spacecraft should lead toward manned landings on the moon and
5/
planets, and toward a permanent manned space station." Low also announced
the name of the advanced spacecraft program, aimed both at the moon and
at space stations; it was 't.- ID be called "Project Apollo."
All of the debate was effectively terminated by John P. Kennedy's
6/
May 1961 announcement that "I believe we sr,CUld go to the moon." - As
NASA planners accepted Kennedy's challenge and chose lunar•-orbit rendezvous
as the approach to accomplishing a lunar landing mission before 1970, any
chance of developing a space station in the 1960s disappeared. The rest
of the decade was spent studying the concept, with the anticipation that
it would be the logical post-Apollo program.
C.	 Space Station Plans During the 1960s
Throughout the sixties, there were almost always funds available for
engineering and design studies of future concepts. These studies were
conducted both within NASA and by the various aerospace contractors (par-
ticularly those without a major role in Apollo), and they resulted in
the examination of a wide variety of concepts, ranging from inflatable
balloon-like structures, through the use of refurbished rocket stages, to
very large stations requring the use of Saturn V boosters to put them in
9
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orbit. Three NASA field centers, the Manned Spacecraft Center in Texas,
the Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama, and the Langley Research
Center in Virginia, managed these in-house and contractor studies, and
they were coordinated by the Advanced Missions Office of the Office of
Manned Space Flight at NASA Headquarters in Washington.
These studies and the various concepts which evolved from them will
not be reviewed in detail in this report, since the focus here is on the
policymakinq process rather than on the development. of :specific technological
6/
proposals.	 Rather, the interaction between the study process and periods
at which NASA leadership gave serious thought to proposing post-Apollo
space goals and space programs to the President and Congress will be the
focus of attention.
1. Advanced Planning , 1962-1768	 Some attention to the technical
planning effort is needed, however, to get a sense of what concepts were
being most actively explored. While the manned flight centers at Houston
and Hunstville were focussing almost their total energies on getting
Apollo started in the early 1960x,* the Langley Research Center was giving
substantial attention to the theoretical and engineering aspects of space
station design. These efforts dated from at least mid-1959, and by 1962
,enough work had been done to form the basis for a space station symposium.
Langley researchers noted that "a large manned orbiting space station
may have many uses or objectives." Among these objects they listed:
*Even so, both Houston and Hunstville had space station study efforts underway;
In particular, Houston was studying a large (24-person) space station launched
by a Saturn V. (See reference 6.) The studies directed by Langley have
been chosen for review because they were more fully developed than those
directed by the other two centers.
.+
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1.	 Learning to live in space
a. artificial-gravity experiments
b. zero-gravity experiments
c, systems research and development
	
2.	 Appl16t ons research
a. communications experiments
b. earth observation
	
3.	 Launch platform experiments
	
4.	 Scientific research
With respect to launch platform experiments, Langley suggested that "the
space station with its crew of trained astrenauts and technicians should
be a suitable facility for learning some of the fundamental operations
necessary for launching space missions from orbit. The new technologies
required for rendezvous, assembly, orbital countdown, replacement of
8/
defective parts, and orbital launch can be determined."—
Among the various space"station studies carried out by Langley contractors
1.^_ rs__.^. V_ C t il.x ACnn perha p se	 AC} deta il edOt'a  A!'I IAfaS that Of a MannedClurinq the Tl rsc na l 1 o0	
th
e 1760x,  a s the most ta_d	 h__
Cvv ,nli,gl Research Laboratory (MORL) conducted by Douglas Aircraft from 1963 to 1966.
Douglas had had some prior interest in space stations; in 1960 it had built a
full-scale mockup of a four-person astronomical space observatory as the central
theme of an "ideal home exhibition" held in London. This station was to
be constructed inside the fuel tank of a second-stage booster, a Douglas
9/
idea which ultimately found use in the Skylab program over a decade later.—
In this study, a baseline technical concept for a Manned Orbital Research
Laboratory 'MORL) was established first, then the "utilization potential" of
such a station examined, i.e., design preceded requirements. When the origi-
nal design was compared to various requirements, it was inadequate, and a
larger station in a different orbit evolved as the final result of the study
i
effort. The study found that the highest utilization potential came from
"key engineering and scientific research studies augmented by specific
1
experiments directed toward potential Earth-centered applications."
	 !
I-9
As the study effort proceeded, the MORL got steadily more complex and
bigger, as there were no criteria established to limit the addition of
new experimental requirements. Table 1 illustrates the growth and changes
as the concept evolved.
The MORL requirements study examined:
1. earth-centered applications
2. national defense
3. support of future space flights
} 4. the space sciences
From this analysis, the study predicated the need for "hundreds of thousands
i of manhol ► rs" in orbit to carry out all useful applications; this implied
a long-range requirement for "near permanent operations and support of
probably several space stations." The study also noted, foreshadowing a
future issue, that "the limiting factor on the number of such stations,
and the crew size of each station, appears to be the cost of logistic
support." Figure 2 is the final MORL concept; although basically a
zero-gravity station, the station had an on-board centrifuge for re-entry
simulation, testing of physical condition, and physical therapy if zero-
gravity conditions were debilitating for the crew. 10/
2. Management Attention to a Space Station. By early 1963, NASA
Associate Administrator and General Manager Robert Seamans called for
study of an Earth Orbiting Laboratory (EOL) from "an overall NASA point
of view." Such study was needed, said Seamans, since an EOL had been
studied and discussed "by several government agencies and contractors"* and
* Though it is not discussed in detail in this report, during this
period the Department of Defense was exploring the potential of manned
flight for national security missions. Some of this study effort was con-
ducted jointly with NASA, but most was not; one focus of the effort was the
military potential of a space station. In 1963, the Air Force's Manned
Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) program was approved as an initial step in
examining ways in which human crews could be used to enhance national
security operations in orbit. The MOL program was cancelled in 1969.
i
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Figure 2. MANNED ORBITAL RESEARCH LABORATORY CONCEPT
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Sept. 1963	 Nov. 1964	 Feb. 1966
Manhours of experiments
Crew size
Program duration
Orbit
Launch date
Cost ($ million)
w/o operations
9670
4
1 yea;-
28.72 degrees
200 n.mL,
1968
$1050
19,500
6
2-5 years
28.72 degrees
200 n.mi.
1970
$1566
53,000
9
5 years
50 degrees
164 n.mi .
1972
$1939
Source: Douglas Missile and Space System Division, "Report on the Development
of the Manned Orbital Research Laboratory (MORL) System Utilization
Potential," SM-48822, January 1966, p. 14.
TABLE 1. MORL Concept Evolution
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because NASA and DOD "are now supporting a number of additional advanced
studies." Seamans' reference to DOD was significant; NASA and DOD were
locked in a controversy over control of post-Apollo manned flight efforts.
NASA's management, anticipated Seamans, would "be faced with the decision to
initiate hardware development" in 1964. Seamans ordered an agency-wide, 4-6
week high-priority study which would examine EOL proposals in terms of, among
other factors:
a. Defense Department interest
b. International factors	 11/
c. Other government agency interest
Throughout this study and other attempts to define a spare station program
in the 1963-1966 period, there was a continuing tension between those designing
the station itself (primarily associated with the Office of Manned Space Flight,
its field centers, and associate contractors) and those interested in the experi•-
ments and other uses of such a facility (primarily the Offices of Space Science
and Applications and the Office of Advanced Research and Technology). For
example, one OART staffer complained in 1963 that "the fact that OMSF is
supplying funds for MORI. . . . does not change the fact that in doing so they
are in a supporting role to the experimental purpose of the MORL. That experi-
mental purpose should carry a heavy stick in the determination of how the
12/
research program will be accomplished."—
Later in 1963, the Director of OART asked field center assistance in
defining "more clearly the potential usefulness of such a laboratory as a
platform for scientific and technological research in space." He noted
that "a view has prevailed to date, based primarily on intuitive judgment
[emphasis added], that this research function (exclusive of biotechnology
and human factors research) constitutes one of the more important long-
range ,justifications" for a space station. It was essential, he argued
I-13
,Y	 to make "a correct decision as ` to­ whether and /why a MOL [manned orbital
laboratory]* project should be undertaken."
	 By 1964, the definition of
uses for a space station had broadened enough to lead the director of the
OMSF Advanced Manned Mission Office to suggest that it was "both timely
and necessary to pursue . . . broadly beneficial uses of space stations
with the departments and agencies that will capitalize and exploit these
broader uses" and that an interagency "applications working group" be
established for this purpose. Such interagency involvement, he noted,
"can result in a higher level of knowledgable support to NASA for
14/
implementation of a national multi-purpose space station program."
Neither 1964 nor 1965 were propitious years for proposing major new
starts in the national space program. In 1964 a careful in-house examination of
NASA's future options had recommended that NASA defer "large new missions
15/
for further study and analysis."	 However, there was concern within NASA about
maintaining an adequate work load as the development phase of the Apollo neared
completion for both NASA centers and NASA contractors, and an evolutionary
approach from Apollo to more advanced missions appeared more likely to meet this
need, given the low probability of a major new start on post-Apollo programs.
A 1963 change in test philosophy made by OMSF head George Mueller made it
it likely that there would be surplus Apollo command and service modules and
lunar modules and Saturn boosters available which could be used for earth orbital
missions. As an interim measure to keep NASA's manned spaceflight centers busy
and in order to utilize the surplus Apollo hardware, in 1965 NASA formally
initiated an Apollo Applications Program (AAP). In a sense, AAP became not only
a bridging program between Apollo and whatever new program would follow it, but
also a reason for deferring space station approval until results from the central
AAP project (later called Skylab) were in.
3.'
	
* This is not a reference to the Air Force's MOL program.
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With the Apollo Applications Program underway and Apollo itself
pushing toward an initial lunar landing in 1968 or 1969, by mid-1966 NASA
top-level management recognized that it was "timely Oat we update our
studies of a permanent manned station." This agency-wide study was to be
divided into two parts; one effort would focus on system design, the other
on the "need for, the requirements of, and the constraints on a space
station" to support a number of objectives:
1. Astronomy with large optical and radio telescopes
2. Geographical studies with emphasis on earth resources
3. Meteorological sensor development
4. Biological research
5. Aeromedicai research and development
6. General laboratory research and development in advanced
technology
7. Flight operations development directed toward more efficient
resupply, service, and orbital operations
8. Long duration flight leading to a future missions capability
of manned flight to the planets
The study charter emphasized that "it is still a question whether a
permanent space station is the best approach to achieving the envisioned
mission objectives," and called for a review of both advantages and disad-
vantages of a station as the means for accomplishing them. Finally, the
study charter indicated that the request for such a study "is in no way
an indication of an atlency decision to proceed with or propose a manned
space station; it is very important that this point be clearly understood
by all concerned with the study and by those with whom it is discussed." 16/6
The continuing tension between those establishing requirements for a
station and those proceeding with its design surfaced again during this
study. One participant noted that "the problems engendered by the require-
ments not being available to the design people before embarking on the
design were very evident. Acceleration of the former and delay of the
latter woul(, be very beneficial." This individual compared the space
station to another mission concept, then under active evaluation within
NASA, a manned Mars fly by, and concluded that "of these two, the space
station is the more significant and useful, the more within our technical
grasp, and is a necessary precursor to any manned planetary or other
17/
future manned space program."—'
The requirements segment of the 1966 space station study was directed
by Charles Donlan; the design segment, by E.Z. Gray. It was the Donlan
group in which the conflicts between various experimental objectives and
design requirements were assessed. The Donlan study found that "the most
difficult problem to resolve is the matter of artificial gravity. If ar-
tificial gravity becomes a firm requirement for crew comfort," it noted,
"its implementation can have a very large impact on space station design"
since "zero gravity is a mandatory requirement for major portions of the
experiment programs." Other conflicts included those between astronomical
observations and earth observations, which are "obviously in conflict in
both direction and stabilization modes." The conclusion of this assessment
was that "the manned space station concept emerges as an unparallelled op-
portunity for learning how to exploit the features of space," and that "the
prime justification for a manned station [is] associated with the potential
the station offers For undertaking broad-fused research and development
programs in science and technology addressed 'to all the space objectives
of the United States." The group considered both a single station in which
there would be an attempt to integrate various conflicting experiments by
I-16
sequential scheduling, and a concept of splitting the station into several
components, each optimized for a particular set of activities. The study con-
cluded that "a minimum station that would appear to satisfy much of the
program needs would operate in 200-mile orbit at an inclination of 501,
be capable of operating for a 5-year period, continuously or intermittently,
and large enough to house a staff of from 8 to 12 people." 1818/
3.	 Attempts to Gain Approval for Space Station Program	 Based on
the 1966 space station study and the lead time required to get a space
station program defined and implemented, NASA leadership in the fall of
19ti6 decided to go ahead with what the Donlan Committee had defined as
a minimum space station program, and requested $100 million in the FY 1967
budget for detailed definition (Phase B) studies. The Bureau of the Budget
totally rejected this request, allocating no funds specifically for space
19/
station work, and throughout 1967 and 1968 preliminary studies continued
mainly inside NASA, but at a low level of funding.
As the first successful lunar landing mission approached and as the fun-
ding peak of the by now much-reduced Apollo Applications Program also was
imminent, in the fall of 1968 NASA requested $60 million to initiate a
space station effort. Once again, this request was denied. NASA approached
the beginning of 1969 in some disarray:
--	 James Webb had resigned in the fall of 1968, and the Acting
Administrator, Thomas Paine, was new to the agency
--	 Richard Nixon had been elected President, and his position
on space policy was far from clear
--	 NASA had settled on the space station as its post-Apollo
program objective, but to date had had no success in getting
Presidential or Congressional support for such an initiative
NASA took bold action in the early months of 1969 to attempt to change
this situation; that effort will be described in the following section.
CHAPTER II
SPACE STATION HOPES PEAK: 1969-1972
A.	 An Unsuccessful Space Station Initiative
Throughout 1967 and 1968, NASA used the limited resources available to
it for advanced mission studies to continue "Phase A ll preliminary conceptual
space station studies, with the hope that during 1969 NASA could initiate
two "Phase B" detailed design studies during 1969. The anticipation
was that the results of those studies would provide the basis for an
agency and national decision to develop a space station. The following
section describes the evolution, implementation, and termination of those
those Phase B studies. However, even before NASA opened bidding on
these design study efforts, its Acting Administrator, Thomas Paine,
made a bold attempt to gain the support of newly-inaugurated President
Richard Nixon for an immediate commitment in principle to the space
station as the centerpiece of the post-Apollo space program. This attempt
was unsuccessful, and in the process NASA may well have lost some of its
credit with the new President and his associates. The history of
this "Paine initiative" is recounted below.
1.	 The Situation Facing NASA	 Even at the peak of its success,
with the spectacular Apollo 8 mission at Christmas 1968 and virtual cer-
tainty that the first lunar landing would come during 1969, NASA faced
a highly uncertain future as that year began. In October 1868, in sub-
mitting the proposed NASA budget for Fiscal Year 1970, which contained
substantial increases in funds and new program starts, including a space
station, Acting Administrator Paine had argued than
II-1
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it is impossible to justify a rational national policy in
which the United States, having invested so much in the
first ten years to develop and demonstrate a capability
	
f
to conduct significant operations in space, turns its back
in the second decade on what it can accomplish. 1/
Paine ' s argument was not convincing; President Johnson and his Bureau of the
Budget (ROB) reduced the NASA budget request, and explicity deferred decisions on
new programs for the incoming Nixon Administration. A Bureau of the Bud-
get issue paper prepared for the new administration summarized the situation:
FY 1970 and FY 191 are critical decision years for the
civilian space program, because the attainment of the
manned lunar landing goal is now imminent, and the lead
time for achievement of major new goals in space is long.
	 .
Chief among [NASA's budget issues] is whether there should
be a program of manned space flight after the first lunar
landing, and if so, what the nature and rate of activity
of that program should be. Large reductions in NASA FY 1970
outlays cannot be made without assuming that the long-term
policy of the Administration will be to minimize or even
eliminate manned space flight activity for a period of at
least 5 years.
The Bureau of the Budget listed arguments for and against major reductions
in the NASA budget
For: The principal argument for exercising some of the
r^Ce 'uction options/alternatives is to reduce government
spending on space, turning the funds to other uses in the
public or private sector. If outlay reductions become
mandatory in the space program, manned space flight ac-
tivities are the only contributors to major savings.
Against: The major arguments against exercising the op-
tionare...abandonment of expensive inventories and local
economic disorientation. In addition, the following ar-
guments can be made for continued manned space flight:
the large investment in a transportation system argues
for some lunar exploration; technological advancement and
competition with the U.S.S.R.; the claimed need for con-
tinuity as a major contributor to reliability and safety;
and possible national security implications of an un-
specified nature.
The political implications of major cuts in the NASA budget were also
projected:
iI-3
^t4
Congressional Committees: The Space Committees support the
program with nd v ua members particularly interested in
specific areas of space. Congress, generally speaking,
votes both ways on the space program. However, there is
no consistent organization opposition bloc. There has beer,
less Congressional support in the 1968-1969 appropriation
cycles than in previous years.
Aerospace Industry: It can be anticipated that the major
aerospace contractors and the Congressmen with major plants
In their districts will oppose strongly any cutback in the
program which forces contract terminations. 2/
2. Paine Decides to Ask for the Moon , (and a Space Station Toro) When the
Nixon Administration took office on January 20, 1969, spa(Ne was not high
on its list of concerns. Thomas Paine continued as Acting Administrator,
and there was no indication from the White House whether he would be given
the job permanently or whether Nixon would appoint his own person to head
NASA.
	
It is standard procedure for a new administration to conduct an early 	 l
3
review of the outgoing government's just-submitted budget. President Nixon
and Bureau of the Budget Director Robert Mayo asked for such a reappraisal
on January 23, with the guidance to agencies that they should attempt to
reduce the budget submitted by a Democratic President. Paine and his
closest advisers decided to take an opposite tack. Paine's predecessor,
James Webb, was extremely cautious about proposing new large programs that
would be politically difficult to support; Paine had no such inhibitions.
He was an aggressive leader and believed strongly in the importance of the
	
NASA program, and he thought that the momentum of the Apollo B success was 	 r
great enough to gain Presidential support for major new initiatives. Thus 1k
,r
he decided to ask the Bureau of the Budget to increase substantially the ;t
FY 1970 NASA budget. In justifying this requested increase, Paine argued
that "critical program and funding decisions were specifically deferred
Xi 4
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to President Nixon's Administration and must now be made." Paine asked
for budget increases in three areas;
1. lunar missions with enhanced scientific value
2. resumed production of the Saturn V launch vehicle
3. space station studies and long leadtime development of
space station subsystem items. 3/
In an unusual move for an agency leader in a new administration, much
less one serving in an acting capacity, Paine also appealed directly to
the President in support of the manned space flight program. He argued
that "positive and timely action must be taken by your Administration now
to prevent the nation's programs in manned space flight from slowing to
a halt in 1972" and suggested that "the nation should . . . focus our manned
space flight program for the next decade on the development and operation
of a permanent space station -- a National Research Center in earth orbit --
accessible at reasonable cost to experts in many disciplines who can con-
duct investigations and operations in space which cannot be effectively
carried out on earth." Paine told the President that he had "a unique
opportunity air leadership that will clearly identify your Administration
with the establishment of the nation's major goals in space flight for
the next decade" and that "the case that a space station should be a
major future U.S. goal is now strong enough to justify at least a general
statement on your part that this will be one of our goals."
Paine described NASA's space station concept for the President in
some detail;
The space station... should become a central point for many
activities in space, and would be designed to carry on these
activities in an effective and economic manner. It would be
located in the most advantageous position to conduct inves-
tigations and operations in the space environment, many im-
;r
L
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portant aspects of which cannot be duplicated in an earth-
based environment. The best place to study space is in space.
We have in mind a system consisting of general and special-
purpose modules with a low-cost logistic support system that
will permit read, access and return by many users and their
equipment and sk,plies. The space station would not be
launched as a single unit, but would evolve over a period
of years by adding to a core new modules as they are regiai ►,ed
and developed. One of the key objectives is to develop the
system in cooperation with the Department of Defense so that
F
it can be adaptable for future military research as well as 	
fi
for a variety of non-military scientific, engineering, and
other applications purposes.
There are many potential valuable uses of such a space
station, and new ones will be found as experts in many fields
become familiar with the possibilities and are able to visit
and actually use it. However, we believe strongly that the
Justification for proceeding now with this major project as
a national goal does not, and should not be made to depend
on the specific contributions that can be foreseen today in
particular scientific fields like astronomy or high energy
physics, in particular economic applications, such as earth
resources surveys, or in specific defense needs. Rather.1 VYVMt
the justification for the space station is that it is clearly
the next major evolutionary step in man's experimentation,
conquest, and use of space. The development of man's cap-
ability to live and work economically and effectively in
space for long periods of time is an essential prerequisite
not only for operations in earth orbit, but for long stay
times on the moon and, in the distant future, manned travel
to the planets. It is for these reasons that I believe that
space station development should become one of your Adminis-
tration's principal working goals for the nation over the
next decade. 4/
Given the existence of the STG, Paine had to justify his request for
an early Presidential commitment to a space station. One argument he used
was the "distinct possibility" that t he Soviet Union would launch a space
station prior to the time the STG was to report its findings, and "that
would take the edge off your announcement of a similar U.S. objective in the
fall." By making such requests to the President, Tomas Paine was short-
cutting both the normal budget process and a specific planning process for
space which had Just been established. His approach was a high-stakes gamble,
and, unfortunately from NASA's point of view, one which he lost.
11-6
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	 30	 NASA's. Proposals Reviewed Paine asked for a. March 31 Presiden-
tial decision on future manned space flight issues. He did this even
though he knew that, on February 13, the President had established an ad-
hoc blue-ribbon Space Task Group (STG) and had asked that group for "definitive
recommendations on the direction which the U.S. space program should take
'y
in the post-Apollo period," with a September 1 reporting date. By asking
i
the President to decide on the future of manned space flight in advance
of the planning process which was being established for precisely that
purpose, Paine was trying to use the success of the Apollo 8 mission and
the desire on the part of any new administration to take some early and
popular policy initiatives as counters to a process which he was not
sure would be Favorable to NASA. During the transition period after the
November 1968 election, President-elect Nixon had established a Space
Task Force chaired by Nobelist Charles Townes of Berkeley (also a close
adviser to NASA's manned space flight program). That Task Force had
told the President "we do not recommend a commitment now to a large
space station, extensive developm ,-nt of 'low-cost boosters,' or a manned
planetary expedition." The Task Force did believe that "study of the
possible purposes and design of such a station should be continued," but
that the concept was on "doubtful ground. It is much too ambitious to
be consistent with theresent clear needs for continued exploration ofp	
5/	 i
man's continued usefulness in space."—
The Townes report was an extensive discussion of the many decisions
that had to be made by the new administration in order to define its
space policy, and was a key factor in the early White House deeision
`	 to commission a special study of space policy. In its origin6l concep
	
F ..
tion, this study was to have been directed by the new Presidential Science
M<
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Adviser, Lee DuBridge, former President of the California Institute of
Technology. DuBridge was on record as skeptical of the value of large
manned space programs, and this reflected the general orientation o'l the
President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC). NASA objected strenuously
to a DuBridge-led study, on the grounds that its outcome would be prejudged.
This objection was sustained by the White House, and Vice-President Spiro
Agnew was given the Chairmanship of the Space Task Group, with the NASA
Administrator, the President's Science Adviser, and the Secretary of
Defense (who was represented by the Secretary of the Air Force) as members,
and representatives of the Dep " ,tment of State, Atomic Energy Commission,
and Bureau of the Budget as observers. The Space Task Group was the
forum .,, I thin which a future space policy was intensively debated during the
6/
summer of 1969,— but its first task was to consider NASA's proposed to
make its future actions essentially irrelevant.
The Bureau of the Budget was more than mildly annoyed by the
NASA request for quick policy and budgetary decisions. On March 3, the
BOB Director wrote the President about the proposed budget increases,
noting that
No reductions in other space program areas have been
offered as offsets against these increases.
Our first look at the agency recommendations that we
have received in response to our request shows many more
increases than decreases. In total these requests, if
granted, would make precarious if not impossible the
attainment. of the surplus forecast by the previous Adminis-
tration, which already depends on the extension of the
surtax and the enactment of controversial legislation which
may not be attained. And I know that your conviction is
that our fiscal policy must be addressed to the attainment
of a budget surplus as an essential response to today's in-
flationary environment and the uncertainties surrounding
our commitment in Vietnam.
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In this combination of circumstances, I recommend:
- That you make no statements endorsing future space
objectives until your interagency task group has made
its recommendations and I have had an opportunity to
review them and advise you within the total budget
context. 7/
On the same day, he told NASA that "I am not prepared at this time to
8/
recommend to the President approval of your requested budget increase."r
Thomas Paine had been selected by President Nixon to be permanent
NASA Administrator on March 5, but the selection had not been accompanied
by any indication of a positive Presidential response to Paine's initia-
tive. In fact on March 7, President Nixon responded to Paine's February 26
memorandum and in essence told NASA that its attempts to get an early space
station commitment were unlikely to succeed
Thank you for your thoughtful memorandum on February 26 on
problems and opportunities in manned space flight. I re-
cognize the significance of the issues you raise, and agree
that they merit serious and careful consideration.
In accordance with my instructions, the Budget Director is
engaged in a Government-wide effort to determine where near-
term budget reductions can be made in order to provide for
future programs within the limits of our overall fiscal
policies. He will review your 1970 budget request in that
context.
On February 13, I established a task group, of which you
are a member, to consider future plans for the space prog-
ram. I hope that the task group will devote its primary
attention to a thorough e,;amination of the major alterna-
tives for the next decade in space, their expected accom-
plishments, and their costs. 9/
In preparing for Space Task Group consideration of the Paine initia-
tive, the positions of the various participants on a large space station,
and the factors influencing their positions, became evident.
The BOB objective was to "head off any play by NASA to get a budget
amendment now" since "this is bad budget strategy, probably unworkable as
f1
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far as Congress is concerned, and impossible to obtain without committing
the President to support the long-range objectives." The BOB staff listed
and evaluated four alternatives with respect to the space station and
provided arguments for and against those options. Table 2 presents the
"pros" and "cons" for each of the following alternatives:.
1. endorse now, fund now - "high risk decision at this
point in Me even 7 President wants to go ahead.
Gives most of the control levers away to NASA and
Congress."
2. endorse now, fund later - "a possible course if
res7 ent----believes that at some time in his Admin-
istration we will want to start a large space
station development. Gives opportunity to share
publicly in lunar landing excitement."
3. fund now but don't endorse - "probably unworkable -
either NAS won't get funds past Congress, and Ad-
ministration will experience a 'defeat' or Congress
will appropriate funds and attempt to hold Adminis-
tration to going all the way."
4. postpone decision on endorsement and on funding -
"keeps most management and funding control levers
in President's hands. Passes up an opportunity to
make the most political capital from excitement sur-
rounding MLL [manned lunar landing]." 10/
The President's Science Adviser asked the PSAC Space Science and
Technology Panel to assist him in evaluating the Paine initiative. The
Panel met with NASA officials, and advised Dr. DuBridge that there was
"no great urgency" related to the issues Paine had raised and, "from a
programmatic standpoint, the arguments in favor of early action appear
11/
eery weak."_
The space station did gain some support from the Department of State,
which saw "a close relationship between our space program and foreign
policy objectives. Thus, an ongoing, challenging and successful space
program is important from the viewpoint of these objectives -- particularly
Case 1--Endorse now, Fund now
Pro
1.	 Strongest positive support for
President, clearly identifying
him as moving force behind space
station--as Kennedy and LBJ are
Identified with manned lunar
landing.
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4.	 Give NASA a focus for manned
space flight development and
technology after the manned
lunar landing and AAP.
Case 2--Endorse now, Fund later
Pro
1.	 Implies less Presidential
commitment than case 1.
2.	 Reduces 71-76 budget flexi-
bility less than funding now.
Con
1. Strong identification may not be
favorable if:
--Congress doesn't support
--Public loses interest or uses
as a bad ^example_ of putting big
technology ahead of people-
oriented programs in competition
for Federal support.
2. Puts strain on 1970 budget.
3. Significantly reduces budget
flexibility in 1971-76 period.
4. May, by reaction of aroused in-
terest groups and Congress, freeze
Into a Presidential commitment to
a specific schedule and to sig-
nificantly increased future budgets.
5. Must be done without clear view of:
--Specific anticipated outputs
--Configuration/Launch Vehicle
requirements
--Relationship to DOD require -
ments and programs
--Relationship to NASA unmanned
program
--Costs--which could vary from
$5 B to $50 B depending on con-
figuration and program duration.
Con
1. Implies less Presidential com-
mitment than case 1.
2. Implies 6 mos.-1 year delay in
first flight.
3. Increases odds by 6 mos.-1 year
that the U.S.S.R. may put a space
station in orbit before we do.
4. Reduces 71-76 budget flexibility
somewhat (but less than funding
now).
5. Could still freeze 'into a commit-
ment by reaction of interest groups
and Congress.
2. Moves toward earliest reali -
zation of space station.
3. Best chance to compete with any
large space station efforts of
U.S.S.R. should they occur.
4`	 t
TABLE 2. Bureau of the Budget Space Station Options: Early 1969
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TABLE 2, continued
Pro Con
G. Congressional
	
reaction could
result in appropriation of space
station funds even though they
were not specifically requested.
3. Gives NASA general	 idea of 7. May raise credibility questions
favorable Presidential
	
support since real commitment is funding
for continued MSF development commitment.
technology efforts after first
MLL and AAP.
4. Buys time to consider before pre-
sentation to Congress, in context
of total space program objectives
--Specific anticipated outputs
--Configurations
--Launch vehicle requirements
--Relationship to DOD require-
ments and programs
--Relationship to NASA unmanned
programs
--Costs Yi
5 Avoids strain on 1970 budget r=
Case 3--Fund now but don't endorse
Pro
3
Con
1. Implies less commitment than 1. Because of timing of special	 an-	 rt
case 1. nouncement, and of upward budget
amendment, can be interpreted as
just as strong a commitment as
case	 1.
2. Has all other advantages of 2. Has all	 disadvantages of case 1
cased . except for #1.
Case 4--Postpone decision on endorsement and on funding	 r
Pro Con
1. Avoids any implication of 1. Avoids any implication of Presi-
Presidential
	
commitment. dential commitment.
2. Runs some risk that Congress will
take initiative and advocate go-
ahead.
2. Preserves budget flexibility 3. Clearly postpones first flight by
in 1971-76 time period. 6 mos.-1 year.
	
^s
3. Buys time to consider before 4. Leaves NASA without clear focus
presentation to Congress for MSF development-technollogy
after MLL and AAP.
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TABLE 2, continued
Pro
--Specific objectives and
outputs
--Configurations
--Launch vehicle requirements
--Relationship to DOD programs
and requirements
--Relationship to NASA unmanned
programs
--Costs
4.	 Avoids strain on 1970 budget.
Con
5.	 Misses possible best political
timing--anticipated wave of en-
thusiasm surrounding MLL--to
get new space projects approved
by Congress.
Source: Bureau oT the Budget Briefing Memorandum on "President's Task
Group on Space... Meeting No. 1," March 6, 1969.
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larly one designed and funded to afford increasing opportunities for in-
ternational cooperation." The State Department believed that there were
"greater international values in a space station and reusable logistics
vehicle than in . . . lunar exploration," and that "our choices should not be
unduly influenced by our estimate of Soviet choices, nor do we need to pre-
judice deliberate consideration our space goals in order, to pre-empt Soviet
activities. Our capability is now well understood both by the Soviets and
by most other countries. Foreign countries will focus less on the com-
petition betweFn ourselves and the Soviets than on the relevance of space
activities to their own interests and needs." 12/2
The Department of Defense position was that DOD "does not have or an-
ticipate projects which require a space station as defined by NASA. DOD
has great interest in the development of a lower cost transportation system
W
suitable for their uses as well as for NASA's."
The report of the Space Task Group staff directors was a rejection of
that part of the Paine initiative which asked for an early space station
commitment:
The majority of the Committee members . . . did not support
the request for additional FY70 funding to enable more rapid
progress toward the launch of a space station in the mid
1970's. This view does not represent an unfavorable judg-
ment on the question of adopting the space station as a
major new goal of our space program, but rather results from
a desire not to imply prejudgment of the eventual result of
the STG review. The case for urgency was unconvincing, and
it appears that no important options would be foreclosed by
deferring action. 14/
Paine met with several of the other members of the STG to lobby against
the staff directors' report, but was unable to sway their views, and on
March 22 the STG accepted the report's recommendation. Even at that meeting,
t	 Paine was still arguing that "to put it bluntly, the U.S. manned flight
II-14
program is going out of busitless, unless some decisions and steps are taken
to keep it going."
4.	 Implications of Space Task Group Recommendations 	 The attempt by
NASA to get early commitment to a space station has been reviewed in some
detail because its resolution foreshadowed much of what happened in the
following one and one half years as NASA strugged to gain support for space
station development as its major post-Apollo program objective. Through-
out the Space Task Group review and the White House consideration of the
STG report, NASA argued that the space station, and not the space shuttle
concept which was evolving from the station's logistic vehicle, should be
the Agency's top priority program. In the summer of 1969, NASA let two
Phase B study contracts for space station design, and in its 1970 Congres-
sional testimony the station was presented as the centerpiece of the Agen-
cy's programs, with the shuttle justified primarily as its logistics ve-
hicle. Throughout 1970, NASA continued technical studies and user-oriented
activities to promote the station concept. However, by the middle of that
year, it was clear that, in the eyes of the space subgovernment outside of
NASA, the shuttle program was a more attractive investment than was the
station, and by the end of the year, the station had been dropped back to
conceptual study status. NASA had built up a great deal of momentum behind
the space station concept through the 1960s, but when it came time for
the country to decide, through the policymaking process, whether the sta-
tion was a "good buy," the response was negative. The reasons for this
negative assessment were already clear for NASA to see by March 1969, but
it took over a year for NASA's leadership to recognize the situation and
x	 to steer the Agency away from the station and behind the shuttle. That
process is described in the following section.
zz-16
B.	 Space Station Studies Co to Phase B (and Then Nowhere)
While at the policy level NASA's hope for an early Nixon commitment
to the space station was being dampened, at the engineering level the 	 k`
momentum behind the program was building. After conducting preliminary
Phase A studies, primarily in-house, during 1967 and 1968, NASA was pre-
pared in early 1969 to involve the aerospace industry in defining the
program through two Phase B studies. NASA's hopes were that these program
definition studies would provide the technical basis for a start on space
station development within a year or two. These studies were initiated in
September 1969, and extended over most of the next two years. But events
at the policy level, described in the following section, made it increas-
ingly unlikely that the space station program would ever proceed beyond the
Phase 8 stage, at least in the 1970's. 	 The writing was already on the wall
by the time the "Paine initiative" was rejected in March 1969, but during
the rest of 1969 and 1970 it became much clearer. 	 finally, NASA could no
longer avoid reality, and by early 1971
	
the space shuttle, not the station,
was identified as the agency's top priority. 	 Just as the Apollo Applications
x
Program had been a "better buy" for the country in the mid-1960's, so
r
the shuttle was perceived by policymakers in the early 1970's. 	 But the
failure of the space station program to gain approval was not due to a a
i
lack of effort; the Phase B study process was the focus for that effort.
1.	 Defining the Preferred Concept and Its Rationale 	 One problem, per-
haps the key one, was that NASA found it quite difficult to tell both pros-
17
pective contractors and the political
	 leadership what kind of station, for
what purposes, it wanted to develop. 	 This was so even though NASA had been
studying space station concepts throughout the 1960's. 	 Figure 3 summarizes
the status of the space station program as 1969 began.
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which had emer ged from the study effort were;
1, qualification of man and systems for long-duration
earth, orbit fl ight;
2, demonstration of man's ability and functional use-
fulness in performing_ engineering and scientific
experiments;
3. periodic rotation of the crews and resupply of the
space station.
The average crew size for this station was planned to be six to nine per-
15/
sons, with a two-year orbital lifetime design goal.
	 An Apollo command
and service module launched by a Saturn IB booster was to be the logistics
vehicle for the station; the station itself was to be launched on a Saturn
V booster.
Incorporating these requirements into an agreed-upon statement of
work for the Phase B studies proved difficult. Some sense of the flux in
the process can be gathered from this excerpt from a January 18 letter
from OMSF official Charles Matthews to MSC Director Robert Gilruth:
You have received a letter,
 dated January 14, 1969 from Dr.
Paine requesting personal review and advice on the State-
ment of Work, Space Station Program Definition, Phase B.
The letter was in the context of a January 2, 1969 draft
of this statement of work. Since then, the document has
undergone further review and editing incorporating changes
resulting from comments by Dr. Paine and many other key
NASA personnel. A seventh draft dated January 17, is
hereby forwarded to you for use in the review cycle re-
quested by Dr. Paine.
The questions which were posed to Gilruth and other center directors were
rather fundamental:
1. Are the goals, objectives, and uses of the Space Station
Program stated adequately?
2. Does the Statement of Work imply a sufficiently forward
looking approach?
3. Is there proper emphasis on low cost operations, parti-
cularly with respect to logistics transportation?
11-18
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S.	 Is the Space Station approach as to size, flexibility,
operating mode (zero ""g" and artificial "'g,"" for example,
and safety stated properly? 161
Apparently, what was going on at this point was that. Thomas Paine,
bullish after Apollo S, was pushing for a more exciting space station con-
cept than that emerging from NASA's in-house planning process; Paine wan-
ted to see what the various center directors thought, and for that purpose
convened a January 27, 1969 meeting.
That meeting dramatized the lack of agreement on basic, parameters of
the space station program. Langley Director Ed Cortright commented:
o Subjects requiring more attention:
- USAF and other security applications
- planetary option
o Problems:
- 1975 launch date would preclude major technological
advances
too much Phase A work left undone
- unrelated to future major space base
o NASA top management must agree on general approach (selection
of missions, artificial gravity, timing, goals)
o Give MSFC the space station job, with MSC and other cooperating
o Get with Air Force now
Abe Silverstein, Director of the Lewis Research Center, commented
that "NASA is asking (in mushy language) for something we should know
ourselves before going out. . . . This program must be saleable in terms
people can understand. . . . Low cost in orbit and space station capability
cannot be achieved by finding a series of 'blue book" industry studies;
that only loses us a year and several million dollars."
Wernher von Braun of MSFC struck a theme that Paine found quite
D
attractive:
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NASA should now tell the contractors what we want in the long
run, what we foresee as the ultimate--the long-range--the
dream--station program. NASA should spell out the sciences,
technology, applications, missions and research desired.
Then NASA should define a 1975 station as a core facility
In orbit from which the ultimate "space campus"^'or "space
base" can grow in an efficient orderly evolution through 1985.
Finally, MSC Director Robert Gilruth told Paine: "This work state-
,E
ment doesn't set NASA's sights high enough for the future. We should now
be looking at a step more comparable in challenge to that of Apollo after
Mercury. The space station size should be modular and based on our Saturn
V lift capability into 200-mile orbit. Three launches would give us one
million pounds in orbit, including spent stages. That is the number we
17/
should be planning for the core size.'"—"
The character of the space station was described by one of those most
directly involved in its definition as "quite similar to that of a research
center here on earth" and as "a centralized and sustained base of support
18
and a focus for the conduct of many eandeavors in space." 
L / 
However,
this rationale for the station did not command universal support, even
within NASA. One of NASA's top scientists commented that "considerable
attention is being given...to the search for meaningful experiments to be
conducted in a manned orbiting space station, but at present greater sci-
entific pressures exist to extend the use of small, special purpose satel-
lites toward achieving current goals and objectives, and much work must
be done before clear and meaningful scientific objectives for a space
19/
station can be generated."—'	 Administrator Paine, in explaining the value
of the station to President Nixon in February, said "we believe strongly
that the justification for proceeding now with this major project ... does
not, and should not be made to depend on the specific contributions that
can be foreseen today.... Rather, the justification for the space station
ii
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is that it is clearly the next major evialutionary step in man's experimen.
20/
'ration, conquest, and use of space."­ And George Mueller, NASA's top
manned space flight official, listed a variety of justifications for the
space station in March 1969 Congressional testimony (see Table 3).
i
Out of this lack of consensus within RASA came a rapid change from
the January concept of a space station program; Paine had heard, and agreed
with, the advice of his center directors that NASA should be bolder in its
plans. In February, Aviation Week reported that "all previous concepts
have been retired from active competition in favor of a large station,"
with the focus on "a 100-man earth-orbiting station with a multiplicity of
capabilities" and the "launch of the first module of the large space statio;N,,
with perhaps as many as 12 men, by 1975." Top NASA officials were reported
to have rejected earlier space station plans as "too conservative.' 2121/
The new guidelines for the space station were developed in the weeks
following the January 27 meeting under the direction of Charles Matthews,
Deputy Associate Administrator of Manned Space Flight at NASA Headquarters,
with participation by staffers from OMSF, MSC, MSFC, and LRC. The center
representatives were still in significant disagreement. The MSC represen-
tative noted that "crew sizes smaller than 20 men represent sorties into
space as opposed to what Gilruth would like to see as an agency goal,
namely, establishing an earth-like environment in space." The MSFC rep-
resentatives "didn't agree that the 1975 module had to be designed for
artificial 'g' or had to be a part of the 'ultimate' Space Station," and
felt that OMSF was "getting away from what Dr. von Braun wants ... (6 to 9
men, etc.)."' One of the headquarters participants "didn't agree at all
that there is going to be a 100-man type Space Station," particularly "if
22/
very low cost transportation is feasible and available. "22
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TABLE 3
RATIONALE FOR SPACE STATION - EARLY 1969
* Continued Development of National Capability
Next logical and necessary step
- Major reduction in cost of space operations
International Recognition of U.S. Space Capability
Vis;bie sign of space capability
-	 First international men in space
-	 Preempt the Russian challenge
* Broad Support of Space Science
-	 Oceanography, atmospheric science, meteorology, geophysics
-	 Bioscience and biomedical laboratories
-	 Solar and stellar astronomical observatories
* Potential Exploitation of Space
Advanced earth resources research, agriculture, fisheries, hydrology,
forestry, minerals
-	 Materials processing - crys.tais - composites
-	 Base for building large structures
-	 Resecrch in communications and traffic control
* Experience in Space Operations
Support and maintenance of unmanned satellites
-	 Long duration
-	
Modification - repair and maintenance of instruments and equipment
* Development of the Equipment Required for the Operational Use of Space by
10ther Agencies
Source: Testimony by Dr. George Mueller, Associate Administrator for Manned
Space Flight to House Committee on Science & Astronautics, March 12, 1969.
Published in 1970 NASA Authorization, Hearings ,, Part 2, p. 284.
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By February 19, NASA Headquarters held decided that "the definition
r
study will concentrate on a Space Station Module applicable to the concept
of a much larger space station but with independent capability for applica-
23 /
tion and experiment activities with a 12-man crew starting in 1975."—
A three day meeting later in the month further refined NASA's conception
^j
of the Space Station program which was to have four major elements: 	 1
1. a large Space Base with artificial gravity capability
and composed of modules launched by a two-stage version
of the Saturn V;.
2. a smaller Space Station which is the first dement of
the Space Base;
3. an Intermediate Logistics Systeoi that would be new,
based on a Gemini capsule, available at the first
launch of the Space Station, and would be launched
on either a Tital HIM or modified Saturn V vehicle;
^F
4. an Advanced Logi W cs System which would be a low cost
reusable shuttle.
In a little less than two months, NASA had done an almost complete 	 1i
redefinition of its plans for earth orbital manned flight. Rather than
an evolutionary six to nine person space station serviced by existing launcher
systems, slightly modified, NASA was now ready to announce its plans for an
extremely ambitious program, with four new starts in the period of just a
few years. All of this came at a time when, at the policy and budgetary
level, NASA's request for start-up money on such an accelerated program
was being firmly rejected. Neverthelez, , NASA was now ready to add two
contractors to the team planning the Space Station program. 	 r
2. Phase B Competition	 NASA issued a Statement of Work for the
Phase B Space Station Program Definition on April 19. Prospective con-
tractors were ready; they had been following the rapidly expanding charac-
ter of the program closely and were "already forming teams in anticipation"
24/
of the Phase B competition.	 `
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The Work Statement described the space station as "a centralized and
general purpose laboratory in Earth orbit for the conduct and support of
scientific and technological experiments, for beneficial applications, and
for the further development of space exploration capability" and noted
that the work requested would include "the Space Base but will focus on
the mid-1970s Space Station as the initial but evolutionary step toward
the Space Base." The objectives of the space station program were stated
as;
a. Conduct beneficial space applications programs, sci-
entific investigations and technological and engin-
eering experiments.
b. Demonstrate the practicality of establishing, operating
and maintaining long duration manned orbitan stations.
C *
	
	 Utilize Earth orbital manned flights for test and
development of equipment and operational techniques
applicable to lunar and planetary exploration.
d. Extend technology and develop space systems and sub-
systems required to increase useful life by at least
several orders of magnitude.
e. Develop new operational techniques and equipment which
can demonstrate substantial reductions in unit operating
costs.
f. Extend the present knowledge of the long term biomedical
and behavioral characterist=ics of man in space.
The initial space station was to have a crew of 12, and normally to
operate in a zero gravity mode, but there would be during the early weeks
!	 of its mission an assessment of the effects of artificial gravity; a coun-
terweight would be tethered to the station and the configuration spun to
provide the gravitational effect. The station was to be 33 feet in dia-
meter and was normally to operate in a 270 nautical mile, 55 0 orbit, but
also be capable of operating in polar and slightly retrograde orbits.
Figure 4 is an illustration of the station concept as it appeared in mid-1969.
f
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Figure 4. Saturn V-Launched Space Station Concept
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The Work Statement noted that "the logistic resupply system for the Space
Station and Space Base has not yet been selected." Hope was held out
that the Advanced Logistics System (shuttle) would be available for the
25
first station launch in 1975.`` 
/
There were to be two parallel Phase B contracts of $2.9 million each,
i
one managed by MSC, the other by MSFC; NASA Headquarters would organize a
Space Station Task Force to coordinate the study efforts.*	 The effort was
to be divided among four study areas:
o	 conceptual definition of space base 	 15%
o	 definition of space station - 60%
o	 definition of an initial logistic system - 15%
o	 develop interface requirements for an advanced logistic system - 10%*
The Statement of Work contained a "candidate experiment program" for the
space station, but this was "a summary of an illustrative program ... to
assure the system has the inherent capabilities to support those specific
25/
experiments and other experiments not yet identified."^
Shortly after the original proposals in response to the April 1 state-
ment of work were received by NASA, a new requirement was added to the
Phase B effort. Not only was the space station to be designed so it could
be the core around which a space base could be developed; the station mod-
ule would also be the core of a spacecraft designed for a manned trip to
Mars. This requirement came out of the policy debates described in Section
II.0 below, and was a reflection of the high hopes for all of NASA's future
*The advanced logistic system was the subject of a parallel study effort
which ultimately led to the definition of the earth-to-low-orbit space
shuttle.
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mcuirmu pi-wyrams which were pervasive in the immediate aftermath of the
first lunar landing.
3.	 Phase B Contracts Let; Studies Begin 	 Three aerospace firms,
North American Rockwell, McDonnell Douglas, and Grumman Aircraft, submit-
ted proposals to NASA in response to the Phase B Statement of Work, and
July 22, NASA awarded Phase B contracts of $2.9 million each to North American
and McDonnell Douglas. The studies were to run for 11 months beginning
in September; MSC would manage the North American effort, and MSFC, the
McDonnell Douglas study. Each contractor during the course of the study
would invest significant amounts of its own funds to supplement the NASA
contract, in the hope that it would ultimately be chosen to develop the
space station. Each prime/ contractor was backed up by one or two major
subcontractors and a number of other subcontractors (see Figure B). In
all, an impressive industrial effort was mobilized in support of the space
station Phase B studies.
Both centers organized in-house space station task groups to manage
the contractor and parallel in-house studies; overall coordination and
control of the studies was provided by an OMSF Space Station Steering
Group and Space Station Task Force, and an independent Space Station Re-
view Group oversaw the technical content of the study effort. Quarterly
reviews of the study effort were conducted by top NASA management and
others outside NASA interested in the space station; representatives of
other countries were invited to participate in several of these reviews,
with the hope that non-U.S. firms could participate in the station develop-
ment effort.
One source of continuing tension during the course of the Phase B
studies was the difficulty of integrating station design and the candidate
11-27
OR16INAL PAgt 15
OF POOR QUALITY
Prime contractor
MSC North American McDonnell Oouglas MSFC
Rockwell Astronautics -+^--•
NAS 9 .9953 Space Olvision Company NAS 8.25140
Malor subcontractors
General Electric Martin•Denver
Valley forge 18^+1•Huntsvllle
Other	 Common Other
subcontractors subcontractors subcontractors
ITT•Aerispace Hamilton Standard Collins Spectrolab
Kollsman General Electric Bend15 Centralab
SDc Hughes Minn. Honeywell W,S,Divers
Ouantic Beech Philco Ford Beckman
Eliot Noyes Sylvania Comsat Bendix
AC Electronics Fairchild -Hiller AVCO AROE
Barnes Allis Chalmers OWD Laboratories Radiation
Whirlpool Bell Aerosystems Gulf Atomics Spacecraft
Atomics International Electro-Optical Lockheed
Rocketdyne Boeing Rocket Research
LeRC •AEC Westinghouse AVCO
AlResearch P and W AOV Rocket Tech
Marquardt OCLI Sperry
Sundstrand
Aerojet
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Figure F.	 PHASE B CONTRACTORS AND SUBCONTRACTORS
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experiments proposed for the station. These studies were compiled into a
thick document known universally as the "Blue Book." One participant in
the study later noted that "the candidate experiments compiled in the NASA
Blue Book are too costly to be considered as a whole, are somewhat dupli-
27/
cated..., have not been verified as the true experiment goals...."—`-
4.	 Study Effort Redirected Throughout the first, half of 1970, the
space station studies gathered momentum, aimed toward July completion and
a subsequent NASA request to begin station development in late 1971. For
reasons discussed in Section II.C, in effect the decision that there would
be no space station had already been made, although this was not apparent
to those intensely involved in the Phase B effort.
The Phase B studies were extended for six months on June 30; by this
time, the planning date for the first station launch had slipped to 1977.
The cost of the program was now estimated at $8-15 billion, including
both development costs and 10 years of on-orbit operations; this estimate
did not include the cost of the space shuttle program. It was reported
that "an overriding desire on the part of the United States to internation-
alize the 12-man space station ... has eliminated any possibility of Depart-
„28/
ment of Defense participation in the program. 	 In addition to the tech-
nical design activities, NASA was undertaking a Phase B effort to define
experiment modules to be added to the core station and planning a year-
long study to involve potential users, both domestic and international,
in the program as it was developing. A user's symposium to kick off this
effort was s,., heduled for September 1970, and both study contractors were
building full-scale mockups of the 33-foot station.
Each contractor had come up with a station concept which had met the
requirements of the Phase B Statement of Work, but there were a number of
k
^-	 Y
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differences between their two concepts in areas such as power supply for
the station (solar or isotope generator), environmental control and life
support systems, extent of artificial "g," and experiment priorities.
NASA concluded in July 1970 that it could prepare a Phase C/D Statement
of Work on the basis of the Phase 5 study results already available, but
that was not to happen.
i
On July 29, 1970, Charles Matthews ordered MSC and MSFC to terminate
r.	 the on-going Phase B activity and to redefine the effort in a fundamental
way. NASA leadership had become convinced that the Saturn V program, which
'	 had been in terminal condition for almost two years, was finally dead,
i.e., there would be no booster capable of launching a 33-foot station.
The only launch vehicle available for use in putting the space station
into orbit would be the space shuttle, with its 15-foot by 60-foot pay-
load bay. What had started out as the supply vehicle for the station was
now its key to survival.
That it might be necessary to go to a shuttle-sized space station
had been becoming more evident in the months preceding July. The feasi-
bility of such an approach had been suggested by studies conducted by the
Aerospace Corporation. NASA, while recognizing that it might have to go
to a shuttle-launched station because of the unavailability of Saturn V,
wanted to make sure such a station had comparable capability (12-person
crew, 10- year lifetime, multidisciplinary R&D facility), since "the de-
velopment of an in-orbit research facility is the central focus of our
current studies and this capability will be rapidly lost with any reduc-
tion in crew and vehicle size, vehicle life, and in the general purpose
29/
laboratory and data-processing equipment planned to be on-board."'
On May 4 NASA Headquarters told MSC and MSFC to anticipate paying some
W,
_ .:^
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attention to shuttle-launched stations, and then on July 29 directed the
centers to reorient their study efforts totally in this direction.
Over the next several months, NASA and its contractors did some in-
terim work on modular space station concepts, and NASA issued a Statement
'of Work for a Phase B effort on the modular station on November 16. By
then NASA had given up on attempting, in the initial version of a modular
station, to preserve the same capability as the 33-foot station. The
Statement of Work said
The modular station shall consist of individually launched
modules assembled in orbit and capable of operating at al-
titudes of 445 to 500 kilometers (240 to 270 nautical miles)
in an inclination of 55 degrees. The Initial Space Station
shall be sized to accommodate a crew of six with the first
module launch scheduled for January 1978. This Initial
Station shall also have the potential of growth to a con-
figuration whose capability is equivalent to that of the
12-man, 33-foot diameter station, defined in the original
Phase B effort. The basic program approach of a more
evolutionary type of station capability should provide a
reduction in early funding requirements. The buildup to
this full capability should be complete by 1984 with
operations extending through 1989. 30/
It took some doing to skew the study effort toward components of 14-
foot diameter; one study contractor commented that "people who were eager
to fly in a 33-foot station found the prospect of long stays in the 14-
foot station not very attractive." But NASA did issue Phase B extension
contracts for a modular space station study effort to extend through most
of 1971, and North American Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas went to work on
the new concept. Figure 6 is a representative concept for the modular space
station.
5. Phase B Studies "Fade Away" By the time they began their studies,
however, the likelihood that they would lead to an early commitment to sta-
w
n
k
tion development was already vanishingly small. NASA had suffered a number
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Figure 6. SHUTTLE-LAUNCHED MODULAR SPACE STATION CONCEPT
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of shocks in late 1969 and through 1970 in its attempts to get an ambitious
post-Apollo p rogram approved, and by the summer of 1970 it was becoming
quite clear to NASA leaders that only one big program had any chance of
Presidential and Congressional approval, and that it was not the space
station program. From its start as the "advanced logistics system" for
the station and space base, the space shuttle had garnered the interest
of the Air Force and many within NASA, and in the summer of 1970 the
agency leadership grudgingly decided to make the shuttle its top priority
program. Thomas Paine had announced his resignation, and the station
thus lost a supporter at the top; this may have made the shift to the
shuttle easier.
In September 1970, NASA was simultaneously;
- conducting public meetings to inform potential users of
the characteristics and potentials of a 33-foot space
station
- developing plans for the study of a modular, shuttle-
launched station because the 33-foot concept was dead, and
- preparing a budget request in which space shuttle de-
velopment was given priority, and the space station
dropped from separate program status to an advanced
mission study.
Station studies continued through 1970, 1971, and 1972, with the final
in-house studies being focused on a single research applications module
(RAM) carried into orbit by a shuttle.* This was all that remained of
what, only a few years earlier, had been plans for truly large facilities
in earth orbit. As a final indication of this reality, on November 29,
1972 the Space Station Task Force was abolished, then immediately reincar-
nated as the Sortie Lab Task Force. NASA was able to gain approval for
shuttle development in early 1972, and that task occupied the agency's energies
II-33
throughout the decade. Until the Shuttle was ready, the dream of permanent
human facilities in space would have to wait.
*This concept led to the ESA-developed Spacelab.
b9
team that he "bit the bullet ... today as far as Mars is concerned."
e
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C.	 NASA's Post-Apollo Ambitions Dashed:
While the space station Phase S effort was proceeding apace at the
technical planning level, at the policy level NASA from 1969 through the
end of 1971 was trying to get White House (particularly) and Congressional
support for an increasingly less ambitious post-Apollo program. The
initial forum for this attempt was the Space Task Group, discussed in
Section II.A above. After its early rejection of NASA's space station
initiatives the STG turned to the task of preparing recommendations on
future space policy and programs for President Nixon.
The image of the Apollo commitment as a model for future space goals
colored Space Task Group discussions from the start. At an early STG meeting,
NASA's Administrator, Thomas Paine, argued the need for a "new banner to be
hoisted" around which competent and motivated engineers, scientists, and
managers could rally, as they had around the Apollo goal. Vice.-President 	 31
Agnew, reacting to Paine's point, raised for the first time in the STG context
the question that would influence much of the group's debates: Where was
the Apollo of the 1970's? Could it be, asked Agnew, that the United States
should undertake a manned mission to Mars?
When Agnew first read the staff proposals for STG consideration, he
reportedly was disappointed because none contained the strong and dramatic
theme he thought was required for the national space effort. On duly 16,
1969, as he joined thousands at Kennedy Space Center to watch the lift-
off of the Apollo 11 mission, Agnew "went public." In interviews at the
launch site Agnew said that it was his "individual feeling that we should
	 j
articulate a simple, ambitious, optimistic goal of a manned flight to 	
tA
Mars by the end of this century." After lift-off, Agnew told the launch
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Agnew's statement at Cape Kennedy was not a spontaneous reaction to
the excitement of the occasion; it had been planned in advance. It
reflected Agnew's willingness to lend support to an ambitious and bold
space program, if only NASA would propose it. This willingness matched
the predispositions of NASA head Paine, himself disappointed at the lack
of excitement and purpose he was getting from the organization's planning
machinery. Spurred on by Agnew's private and public support, Paine
decided that NASA should also "bite the bullet" and move aggressively to
identify an early manned Mars mission as the central focus for its future
plans. In order to do this, he ordered NASA planners explicitly to
incorporate a manned Mars mission during the 1980's into NASA's overall
plans. This was the source of an early modification to the Phase B study
requirements described in Section II.B.3 above.
There were several reasons for switching to the Mars emphasis as a
central theme in NASA planning. Perhaps most influential was the early
STG rejection of a space station commitment based on the "logical next
step rationale." By justifying a space station as a necessary precursor
to manned Mars missions in the eighties, Paine hoped to provide a convincing
rationale for the station's urgency. Not only space stations, but also
the newly-proposed space shuttle, the development of nuclear rocket
engines, and the retention of the large Saturn V as a booster were required
if an early manned Mars landing were to be approved as a national goal.
Between March and August 1969, as the Apollo program and other
ongoing NASA missions achieved spectacular successes and public interest
in space was at a peak, as the Vice President continued to ask for an
"Apollo for the seventies," as a key segment of NASA, its manned flight
organization, coalesced behind an aggressive plan of new activities for the
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next decade, and as NASA head Thomas Paine became more and more bullish
about the need for ,bold new initiatives as a way of keeping the nation's
civilian space program vigorous and his agency's momentum large as Apollo
came to an end, NASA plans had gotten increasingly ambitious. (See Table
4 for a sense of the program alternatives NASA was suggesting to the
STG.) Now, by asking for "commitment in principle" to the most ambitious
plan his advisers had conceived, Paine presented a challenge to the other
STG members and to others interested in the future of the space program.
He told the nation that NASA was ready to begin a program that would send
men to Mars at the earliest feasible time, and ho asked the nation's 	
a:
leadership whether they were willing to support such a bold enterprise.
The answer was not long in coming, and it was a resounding "No."
The results of NASA's at-en-- to mobilize support behind the manned
Mars objective, were, from the. Agency's perspective, little short of
disastrous. What NASA discovered was just how limited the support for
major new space initiatives was. The final STG report, submitted to the
President in mid-September, did suggest that "the United States accept
the long range option or goal of manned planetary exploration with a
manned Mars mission before the end of this century as the first target."
This goal, said the report, would act as "a shaping function for the post-
Apollo space program." Beyond its general statements, the report
recommended no commitment to any particular program option or even any
specific project on a particular time table.
Even this "mated Martian manifesto" had no standing with the White
House. Although the STG finished its work with its submission to the
President, more than six months passed before Nixon made any formal
reaction to the Group's recommendation, and that reaction was noncommittal.
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TABLE 4
Alternative NASA Programs Presented to Space Task Group
in August 1969
Program A Program B Program C
12-man Space Station 1975 1976 1977
Shuttle 1975 1976 1977
50-man Space Base 1980 1980 1984
100-man Space Base 1985 1985 1990
Lunar Orbit Base 1976 1978 1981
Lunar Surface Base 1978 1980 1983'
First Manned Mars Expedition 1981 1983 1986
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In the interim, the , processes of public policymaking operated on the space
program to shape it to the short and longer-term requirements of what the
White House perceived as the budgetary and political interests of the
nation. When NASA tried to use the STG report as the basis for justifying
its 1971 budget request, it found that the report's recommendations carried
little weight either in the Bureau of the Budget or, particularly, the
White House. While the President personally apparently remained a space
buff, his advisers were quite skeptical of the political benefits of major
new activites in space; their reading of public opinion was that society
had little interest in future space spectaculars. This skepticism, combined
with stringent budgetary constraints, resulted in a budget for NASA in fiscal
1971 that was far below NASA's most pessimistic expectations. NASA, still
not reconciled to the notion that space had little political support, "fought
a retreating action through the entire budget process," being "beaten back
but fighting lustily at every turn of the road," according to Administrator Paine.
It was in this context that, during the first half of 1970, it became
clear to NASA leadership that NASA would not get approval to develop
simultaneously both a space station and the space shuttle. In a March
1970 statement, President Nixon provided only a very guarded endorsement
of future space activites, and he gave what priority was granted to the
space shuttle. Congress during the 1970 debate over NASA's budget
expressed a high degree of skepticism about ambitious new goals in space.
The linkages among the shuttle program, development of a space station,
and a manned Mars expedition came under particular attack, and attempts
to delete funds for station and shuttle studies were made in both the
House and the Senate. As the preceding section described, at the technical
levee NASA was still acting in mid-1970 as if space station approval were
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possible. However, NASA's policy leadership grudgingly read the writing
(which was in capital letters) on the wall, and in putting together the
next agency tudget request in September 1970 decided to make the shuttle
the top priority NASA program for the 1970s and to give up attempts to
gain approval to develop a space station until after the shuttle program
was well underway.
Using the budget process, the political leadership of the country
{	 had applied its concept of national interest and national priorities to
i
	 the space program; through that process, the technological aspirations of
NASA were put under firm political control. What happened to NASA's space
station plans is best viewed, not in terms of NASA "winning" or "losing,"
but in terms of what happens when an agency's aspirations are significantly
at variance with what political leaders judge to be both in the long-term
interests of the nation and politically feasible. This experience might
be quite relevant to current attempts by NASA to gain support for a space
station program.
r
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CHAPTER III
EPILOGUE: THE SPACE STATION
BECOAES A CONSUUCTIUN SHACK
A. Introduction
During 1973, NASA carried out a "quasi-space station" effort, Skylao.
Skylab was not a true space station, as defined in this report, because the
modified Saturn upper stage used to house the orbital facility was not
equipped for resupply of key expendable items, and thus the facility could not
oe used over a multi-year period. The orbital workshop 41as l auncited in May
1973, and during the year three three-person crews occupied Skylab for periods
of 28, 59, and finally 87 days. Tide results of the Skylab program provided a
major stimulus to NASA's once again beginning to examine the space station
concept in the rni d-1970s .
Other influences in this direction included the need to begin to
identify potential "post-shuttle" programs and new requirements for mannea
space operations emerging from a number of study efforts being carrieu out by
NASA in the 1974-1975 time frame. In order to build a plausible rationale for
once again proposing a space station as an element of NASA's program, it would
be necessary to identify some high priority missions which could not be
accomplished using the space shuttle, with its 7-3U day orbital staytime, its
Spacelab facility for manned experimental activities, and its significant
capability for lifting large and/or heavy cargoes to low-earth orbit. Studies
which established requirements for large structures in both low-earth and
geosynchronous orbit, structures which could only be constructed in space,
seemed to provide the needed rationale, and space construction became a major
theme in space station studies during the 1975-1980 period.
III-1
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This cnapter briefly traces the evolution of NASA's thinking on space
stations during the 1975-80 period, as this new rationale for a perlitanent
manned orbital facility was developed anu elauorated.
B. Development of the "Construction Shack" Concept
The first NASA foray into a new station effort was a 1975 study of
"Manned Orbital Systems Concepts" carried out by McDonnell Douglas
Astronautics under the technical direction of the Marshall Space >+1igilt
Center. This study "examined the requirerients for ... a cost-effective
orbital facility concept capable of supporting extended manned operations ill
Earth orbit beyond those visualized for the 7- to 30-day Shuttle/Space'lab
system." Study guidelines included use of available hardware developed for
the Skylab, Spacelab, and Shuttle programs "insofar as practical" and an
initial operational capability in late 1984.
The context for the MUSC study included a growing concern about the
Earth's resource limitations, population growth, and environmental stresses,
driven by the widely publicized "limits to growth" debate of the early 1970s.
Tne study noted that "the planning and development of future space programs
cannot be done in isolation from the many critical problems facing the peoples
of the world during the coming decades" and that "there will continue to be
many conflicting and competing demands for resources in the years ahead."
This context skewed the emphasis in establishing missions for the facility to
"the research and applications areas that are directly related to current
world needs."
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Though oriented more directly than past station concepts to high
priority global probl eris, the 110SC study still emphasized the "science and
applications research facility" rationale; although such activities as
assembly of large structures and operating space manufacturing facilities Caere
examined during the study, the emphasis was on a facility which would "enable
the scientific community to pursue programs directly relaced to the
improvement of life on Earth." The final MOSC configuration called for a
four-man modularized facility; the manned module would be based on the
Spacelab design, and Spacelab pallets would also be used to support
unpressurized payloads. Figure 7 shows the MUSC configuration. Total program
costs for development and operation of the initial MOSC facility were
estimated to be $1.2 billion.l
Ra`0er than attempt to gain approval to tale thin, MUSC effort to a Phase:
B stage, NASA in the fall of 1975 decided to conduct two parallel space
station systews analyses in which the emphasis was shif'ceo from research in
orbit to space construction. In explaining its study plans, NASA noted:
Earlier space station studies emphasized the "Laboratory in
Orbit" concept. Emphasis is now being placed on a Space Station
as an "Operational Base" which not only involves a laboratory but
also such uses as; (a) an assembly, maintenance, and logistics
base for conducting manned operations involving antennas, mirrors,
solar collectors, transmitters; (b) for conducting launch and
retrieval operations for orbit-to-orbit and Ear-;h-departure
vehicles which may require assembly or propellant transfer in
orbit, (c) for conducting retrieval, maintenance and redeployment
operations for automated satellites; (d) for managing clusters of
spacecraft and space systems as a central base for support for
common services...
Orbital location studies will emphasize the possible
exploitation of geosynchronous orbit, as well as low inclination
and polar low earth orbit—Current  , planning is directed toward a
space station new start in FY 1979.2
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Figure 7. MANNED ORBITAL SYSTEM CONCEPT
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There were a number of reasons for NASA's swi tch in empoasi s in space
station ,justification. There was no evidence that the scientific coma pity
was any more supportive of a manned orbital laboratory concept in 1975 than it
had been in 1970; prior attempts to Justify a space station on its use as a
space-based R&D facility had not been successful. More positively, the
mid-70s saw a number of studies of the potentials of space operations for
addressing problems on earth.
The atost broadly-conceived of these studies was undertaken by a NASA
study group which was asked by WASA Administrator James Fletcher in 1974 to
provide an "Outlook for Space" -- "to identify and examine the various
possibilities for the civil space program over the next twenty-five years."
The study group concluded that "the great challenges facing the physical needs
of humanity are principally the results of the continuing struggle to imp mve
the quali ty of life. Particularly critical is the need to improve food
production and distribution, to develop new energy sources, to meet new
challenges to the environment, and to product and deal with natural and man-
made disasters. In each of these areas, we found that significant
contributions can be made by a carefully-developed space program." The NASA
report recognized that "future space programs must provide a service to the
public." In responding to the "Outlook for Space" report, James Fletcher set
as a primary NASA goal "accelerating the development of economic and efficient
space services for society," such as "resources management, environmental
understanding, and commercial returns from the unique contributions of
space."J
The "Outlook for Space" report was not directly or strongly supportive
of the need for a space station. It did conclude, however, that:
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Most of these activities might well be supyorted by the
^ Shuttle system, together A th associate space laboratories anu
). ree-flyers. There are aore far-reaching objectives, however,
which will require human activities in space transcenaing those
supportable by current Shuttle flight plans, such as the
construction of sa tellite potte r stations or the establishment of a
permanent lunar base. It is difficult at this time to assert that
either of these activities, or others like theca - space
manufacturing, space colonies - will be undertaken within the next
25 years. Nevertheless as we looked at the future of space,
particularly at those more creative programs directed toward major
exploitation of the opportunities which space provides, vie
Inevitably found man to be an integral part of the system. If the
Uniteu States is to be in a position to take advan-cage of these
potential benefits then it would seem necessary that we develop
toe capability to operate a permanent rianned facility in space in
which human crews could operate for extended periods of time. The
space facility would be constantly available, alzhou6h crews
would, of course, be periodically exchanged.
The creation of such a permanent space facility seeiaed to us
to be the most useful way to continue the advancement of manned-
f1ight technology. With the Shuttle system giving us
comparatively low-cost access to space on the one hand, and the
economics which could be reallZed from the use of the numianenx
space facility on the other hand, the construction of a permanent
space station appears to be the next logical step for the manned
flight program - not as an objective in itself, but rather for its
technological support of a nur;1ber of other objectives which can
benefit from our growing knowledge of how h4mans can work in space
and to provide a foundation for the future.
In addition to the "Outlook for Space" study, in the mid-1970s a number
of even more visionary efforts were identifying challenging future space
goals. One notion which received wide public attention, but had a relatively
modest influence on NASA's internal planning activities, was the proposal by
Princeton Professor Gerard O'Neill that primarily in response to the Earth's
resource limitations work begin on developing very large human habitats in
space -- space colonies. A concept which was quite attractive to WASA's
engineers was developed by Peter Glaser of Arthur U. Little, Inc.; this was
the proposal than large solar arrays in geosynchronous orbit could provide a
I
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source of continuous energy on earth. f{te solar power satellite (SPS) idea
was given a great deal of technical attention by OAStk during 1575 and 1576,
until NNSA was forced by the Uffice of hlanagemen°c and Budget to turn over lead
responsibility for SAS to the Energy Research and Development Administration
(soon to become part of the Department of Energy).
Developing a SPS would require extensive on -orbit manned operations and
the capability for assembling very large structures in space. Similar
construction requirements were derived from less grand schemes involving large
antennas in space for coomunicatioos use and scientific invescigations.
By the end of 1575, NASA had developed a plausible argument that space
construction might be a major requirement of its prograi; ►s during the 195Us,
and wanted to explore the role of manned orbital facilities in carrying out
these construction efforts. In December 1975 the agency issued a request for
proposals for a "Space Station Systems Analysis Study"; the study effort was
to be focussed around the use of a space station to "serve a wide range of
operational base arid space laboratory activities," such as using the station
"as a test facility and construction base to support manufacturing,
fabrication and assembly of various sizes of space structures." 6 Aviation
Week reported that the station studies reflected NASA's "belief that a large
permanent U.S. facility in space is the logical follow-on to develoment of the
spare shuttle".6
Two parallel study contracts for the Space Station Systems Analysis
Studies (SSSAS) were let by NASA in April '1976; one went to McDonnell-Douglas,
which would work under the direction of Johnson Space Center, and the other
other went to Grumman Aerospace, which would work with Marshall Space Flight
YXl-^
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Center. The studies were budgeted at $7110,000 each and were scheduled for an
1cj-month duration.
The Mcdonnell-Douglas SSSAS study focussed on four oo,;ectives which
offered "the promise of; serving important needs of man on earth; advancing
U.S. preeminence in science and technology; and ultimately generating an
economic return on investment, essential if permanent government support is to
be avoided." These objectives were;
1. a satellite power system;
2. providing earth services for resource management and
communications; the major projects here were 30-meter and
100-meter radiometers;
3. processing materials in space for commercial users; and
4. furthering scientific research.
The study identified a "common point of departure" for meeting these
objectives, which was "the basic requirement for construction Facilities in
orbit." Such facilities would involves crane operations, capabilities for
fabrication and assembly of structures, manned extra-vehicular activity, and
long duration (approximately 30 days per crew) human presence. These
capabilities could best be provided, the study concluded, by a manned
"construction shack" as part of the space construction base; this manned
element would be the last addition of an evolutionary build-up from sortie
flights, through a shuttle-tended unmanned construction base, to a permanently
manned orbital facility. The cost of having a fully capable station in orbit
by 1938, and of the associated missions which the construction base would
perform, was estimated to be $2.4 billion.?
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The Grumman SSSAS reached similar conclusions. It too focusseu on
of ssi ons related to solar povier satellites, space manufacturing, aria
scientifi, experimentations and also on a large- antenna public service
pJatfo nl, and found that a continuously-manned space construction base was an
integral element of the capabilities needed to perform these missions; such a
base, Grumman estimated, could be in operation by early 1986. The study found
that "space solar power emerged as the most compelling mission with the
greatest Impact on the program. Space manufacturing, public service
communications and earth observation, and the solar terrestrial observation
missions fit well within the solar power developr "tenc needs for large energy
power supply, long duration manned presence in space and an in-space
construction facility..."8
One finding of the SSAS studies was that scientific efforts could "go
along for the ride" on space stations capable of supporting construction,
materials processing, and power generation objectives. One aerospace
publication reported that:
The space base concept is one whose time seems to be
coming rather quickly. Until recently, space stations have
been thought of mainly as..."the traditional laboratory in
the sky." Some observers were surprised when construction,
materials processing and power were given roughly equal
status with science...Now, the balance has shi 49d further...
space construction work as the "prime focus" of the
studies.9
When NASA began its SSSAS effort in late 1975, its hope had been to use
the Phase A study results as the basis for a Phase B space station "new start"
in fiscal 1979, i.e., sometime after October 1978. However, i4ASA was unable
to get the approval of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to proceed on
4
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a schedule which would have made such a new start possible. For one thing,
much of NASA's justification was based on using a space station during the
development of a solar power satellite, and UP rld was strongly opposed to the
SPS concept and had taken it away from NASA planners. Both the outgoing Ford
Administration and the incoming Carter Administration rejected a NASA request
for $15 million for space station studies in the FY 1978 budget 10 (In FY
1977, the budget requested for all advanced systems studies had been $13
million.) This rejection, moreover, was quite emphatic, NASA was told that
Ovid ,has very unlikely to consider any substantial funding for the space
station until the space shuttle program was clearly a success. At this time
(1977) the Shu ,t;tle program was experiencing technical difficulties and cost
and schedule ov w ,uns, and the White House was giving serious consideration to
major changes (including possible teroination) in the program. Th is was
hardly a congenial context for NASA to propose a major follow-on program;
Recoynizing that NASA was not going to be aule to start on a major space
station effort anytime soon, by the spring of 1977 NASA officials were
suggesting that "the (Shuttle) orbiter is a significant space station in
itself," and were looking towards ways to enhance shuttle capability to
perform many of the missions that the SSSAS studies had assigned to a space
stationll
C. Johnson Invents the Space Operations Center
Rat-her than being the year in which significant me,rentum behind a space
station program was developed, 1975 turned out to be a year in which there was
essentially no space station activity peer se. The SSSAS studies had
identified, as important steps in extending the capabilities of the space
n,
'i
shuttle, the development of an in-orbit power supply and of shuttle-tended
unmanned orbital platfori.,is for various science and applications aayloads.
Both Johnson Space Center and (Marshall Space Flight Center were studying
orbital power supplies during 1973; the Johnson Space Center concept was
called a power extension platform (PEP), while Marshall Space Flight Center
was examining a 25 kW power platform. Marshall also initiated studies of an
unmanned Science and Applications Space Platform (SASP), and most of the MSFC
1
study activities during the 1978-1960 period were devoted to these two program
concepts. (During 1981 and 1981, (MSFC contracted with McDonnell Douglas to
study an evolutionary program through which an unmanned platform such as the
F,
one defined in the SASP study could grow into a manned platform, and, i.e., a
space station, perhaps one along the lines that McDonnell Douglas had earlier
defined in the 1975 Manned Orbital Systems Concept study.)
While Marshall's emphasis was on an evolutionary approach to space
platforms, theleadership of the Johnson Space Center had, by early 1979,
decided that the center's efforts should refocus on a major space station
effort. Aviation Week reported JSC was "concerned about this lack of
continuing assessment for permanently manned U.S. facilities" and was "mindful
"	 of the growing soviet capability in this area. 02
 Another factor
influencing JSC thinging was "a need for a real goal to maintain the
dedication of present participants in the spaca program and the interest and
enthusiasm of young people in space technology in order to riotivate their
pursuing engineering and science careers."lS
Based on these considerations, JSC during 1979 conducted an in-house
study of a concept identified as a Space Operations Center (SOC).
0: ^ ►
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This study was based on two assumptions- "that the next 10 to 20 years
will include requireoents for large, complex space syste«is" and "that
geosynchronous orbit is clearly a primary operational, area in space in the
coining decades." If these assumptions were valid, JSC argued, then "the space
construction and servicing of these future systems will be more effective with
a permanent, mann-ld operations center in space."
The primary objectives of the SOC were identified as;
o	 The construction, checkout, and transfer to operational omit of
large, complex space systems.
o	 On-orbit assembly, launch, recovery, and servicing of manned and
unmanned spacecraft.
o	 Further development of the capability for permanent manned
operations in space with reduced dependence on Earth for control and resupply.
The SUC study noted that this list of objectives:
noticeably does not include onboard science and applications
objectives, although the free-flying satellites which woulu be
serviced would include mostly those of this genre. The primary
implicatim of this omission is that experiment and applications
requirements will not be design drivers; the SUC will be "optimized"
to support the operational functions of the objectives. However,
experiments or applications which can tolerate the operational
parameters of the SUC can be operated onboard, or an entire
dedicated module could be attached to an available berthing port.
The study developed a concept of a self-contained, continuously- manned
orbital facility built from several shuttle-launched modules. (Figure 8) The
initial SOC crew would be 4-8 people. In addition to a core facility, the
full capability SOC would require a construction facility and a flight support
facility. (Figure 9) The costs of this fully-capable SOC were estimated at
$2.7 billion, with the total facility in place 9-10 years after program
initiation.14
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Johnson Spare Center briefed interested parties on SOC at the end of
November 1979, in anticipation of initiating  a contractor study of the concept
during 1980. One account of this briefing suggested that the "space station
may be ready for a comeback." 15 Perhaps Dore realistic, however, were these
sentences, prominently displayed at the start of the report of the Space
Operations Center study:
It should be noted that there are no NASA plans at present to
implement such a concept. The study reported herein and currently
planned follow-on studies are intended to explore the concept and
develop material for consideration in future planning-16
D. Conclusion
It should be evident from the whole of this report that there can be no
obvious cut-off point for an account of the development of the space station
concept; this report arbitrarily breaks the story at the end of 1979. In the
3
three years since the SOC concept was first publicized at the end of 1979,
14ASA has become engaged in an agency-wide effort to define a space station
program which will represent an attractive investment opportunity to the
nation's leaders. This effort is drawing upon the over two decades of NASA
space station planning described in this report in the context of the success
of the space shuttle, increasing commercial and national security interest in
space activities, and NASA's need to define its post-shuttle directions.
Perhaps this time around, the space station will indeed be accepted as the
"logical next step" in evolving U.S. capabilities to operate in space. If
this is the case, then the years of effort described in this report will have
been j usti f i ed.
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